• แƒคแƒแƒ แƒ›แƒฃแƒšแƒ 1: แƒ’แƒ แƒแƒœ แƒžแƒ แƒ˜ 2019

    2019 แƒฌแƒšแƒ˜แƒก แƒคแƒแƒ แƒ›แƒฃแƒšแƒ แƒ”แƒ แƒ—แƒ˜แƒก แƒ’แƒ แƒแƒœ แƒžแƒ แƒ˜ แƒกแƒแƒ แƒ‘แƒแƒšแƒ แƒกแƒ”แƒกแƒ˜แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒ—

  • แƒแƒ•แƒขแƒแƒ›แƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒ˜แƒก แƒ—แƒ•แƒ˜แƒ—แƒ“แƒ˜แƒแƒ’แƒœแƒแƒกแƒขแƒ˜แƒ™แƒ˜แƒก แƒคแƒฃแƒœแƒฅแƒชแƒ˜แƒ

    แƒ—แƒแƒœแƒแƒ›แƒ”แƒ“แƒ แƒแƒ•แƒ” แƒ“แƒ, แƒ›แƒ˜แƒ— แƒฃแƒ›แƒ”แƒขแƒ”แƒก, แƒ›แƒแƒ›แƒแƒ•แƒšแƒ˜แƒก „แƒญแƒ™แƒ•แƒ˜แƒแƒœแƒ˜ แƒแƒ•แƒขแƒแƒ›แƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒ˜แƒก“ แƒขแƒ”แƒฅแƒœแƒ˜แƒ™แƒฃแƒ แƒ˜ แƒกแƒ˜แƒกแƒขแƒ”แƒ›แƒ˜แƒก แƒ›แƒแƒ แƒ—แƒ•แƒ แƒฌแƒแƒ แƒ›แƒแƒฃแƒ“แƒ’แƒ”แƒœแƒ”แƒšแƒ˜แƒ แƒ›แƒ˜แƒกแƒ˜ แƒจแƒ”แƒ›แƒแƒ“แƒ’แƒ”แƒœแƒ”แƒšแƒ˜ แƒ›แƒ”แƒฅแƒแƒœแƒ˜แƒ–แƒ›แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒกแƒ แƒ“แƒ แƒ›แƒแƒฌแƒงแƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒแƒ‘แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒก แƒ›แƒฃแƒจแƒแƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒก แƒ›แƒฃแƒ“แƒ›แƒ˜แƒ•แƒ˜ (แƒ—แƒ•แƒ˜แƒ—)แƒ“แƒ˜แƒแƒ’แƒœแƒแƒกแƒขแƒ˜แƒ™แƒ˜แƒก แƒ’แƒแƒ แƒ”แƒจแƒ”. แƒ”แƒก แƒแƒฃแƒชแƒ˜แƒšแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ”แƒšแƒ˜แƒ, แƒ แƒแƒ—แƒ แƒ›แƒแƒ แƒ—แƒ•แƒ˜แƒก แƒกแƒ˜แƒกแƒขแƒ”แƒ›แƒแƒ› แƒ“แƒ แƒแƒฃแƒšแƒแƒ“ แƒ›แƒแƒแƒฎแƒ“แƒ˜แƒœแƒแƒก แƒ แƒ”แƒแƒ’แƒ˜แƒ แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ แƒกแƒ˜แƒกแƒขแƒ”แƒ›แƒแƒจแƒ˜ แƒ›แƒแƒ›แƒฎแƒ“แƒแƒ  แƒแƒ แƒแƒกแƒขแƒแƒœแƒ“แƒแƒ แƒขแƒฃแƒš แƒ›แƒแƒ•แƒšแƒ”แƒœแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ–แƒ” แƒ“แƒ แƒ”แƒชแƒแƒ“แƒแƒก, แƒ—แƒแƒ•แƒแƒ“ แƒแƒฆแƒ›แƒแƒคแƒฎแƒ•แƒ แƒแƒก แƒ˜แƒ’แƒ˜; แƒแƒœ แƒแƒžแƒ”แƒ แƒแƒขแƒ˜แƒฃแƒšแƒแƒ“ แƒ’แƒแƒแƒคแƒ แƒ—แƒฎแƒ˜แƒšแƒแƒก แƒ›แƒซแƒฆแƒแƒšแƒ˜ แƒฃแƒฌแƒ”แƒกแƒ˜แƒ•แƒ แƒแƒ‘แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒก แƒจแƒ”แƒกแƒแƒฎแƒ”แƒ‘; แƒแƒœ (แƒฃแƒ™แƒ˜แƒ“แƒฃแƒ แƒ”แƒก แƒจแƒ”แƒ›แƒ—แƒฎแƒ•แƒ”แƒ•แƒแƒจแƒ˜) แƒ“แƒแƒ˜แƒ›แƒแƒฎแƒกแƒแƒ•แƒ แƒแƒก แƒ˜แƒกแƒ˜แƒœแƒ˜, แƒ แƒแƒ—แƒ แƒ›แƒแƒ—แƒฎแƒแƒ•แƒœแƒ˜แƒกแƒ—แƒแƒœแƒแƒ•แƒ” แƒ›แƒ˜แƒแƒฌแƒแƒ“แƒแƒก แƒ›แƒแƒ— แƒจแƒ”แƒกแƒแƒฎแƒ”แƒ‘ แƒ˜แƒœแƒคแƒแƒ แƒ›แƒแƒชแƒ˜แƒ แƒกแƒ”แƒ แƒ•แƒ˜แƒกแƒ˜แƒก แƒ—แƒแƒœแƒแƒ›แƒจแƒ แƒแƒ›แƒ”แƒšแƒก (แƒแƒœ แƒ›แƒซแƒฆแƒแƒšแƒก).

  • Sir Vival - แƒ”แƒฅแƒกแƒžแƒ”แƒ แƒ˜แƒ›แƒ”แƒœแƒขแƒแƒšแƒฃแƒ แƒ˜ แƒฃแƒกแƒแƒคแƒ แƒ—แƒฎแƒ แƒแƒ•แƒขแƒแƒ›แƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒ˜ แƒจแƒแƒ แƒ”แƒฃแƒšแƒ˜ แƒฌแƒแƒ แƒกแƒฃแƒšแƒ˜แƒ“แƒแƒœ

    แƒแƒ แƒกแƒ”แƒ‘แƒแƒ‘แƒ”แƒœ แƒแƒ•แƒขแƒแƒ›แƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜, แƒ แƒแƒ›แƒšแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒช แƒฎแƒแƒœแƒ“แƒแƒฎแƒแƒœ แƒ“แƒ แƒแƒก แƒฃแƒกแƒฌแƒ แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ”แƒœ: แƒขแƒ”แƒฅแƒœแƒแƒšแƒแƒ’แƒ˜แƒ˜แƒ—, แƒ•แƒ˜แƒ–แƒฃแƒแƒšแƒ˜แƒ— แƒ—แƒฃ แƒ.แƒจ. แƒฃแƒจแƒฃแƒแƒšแƒแƒ“ แƒ™แƒ˜ แƒ”แƒก แƒ”แƒ แƒ—แƒ’แƒ•แƒแƒ แƒ˜ "แƒ›แƒฃแƒจแƒขแƒแƒ˜แƒ“แƒ˜แƒก แƒกแƒแƒ‘แƒแƒ•แƒจแƒ•แƒ แƒ›แƒแƒœแƒฅแƒแƒœแƒ" แƒกแƒ˜แƒœแƒแƒ›แƒ“แƒ•แƒ˜แƒšแƒ”แƒจแƒ˜ 1958 แƒฌแƒšแƒ˜แƒก Sir Vival-แƒ˜แƒ. แƒ แƒแƒ›แƒ”แƒšแƒ˜แƒช แƒ•แƒแƒšแƒขแƒ”แƒ  แƒฏแƒ”แƒ แƒแƒ›แƒ˜แƒก แƒจแƒ—แƒแƒ’แƒแƒœแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ—แƒ˜ แƒ›แƒ˜แƒกแƒ˜แƒ แƒ˜แƒงแƒ แƒจแƒ”แƒ”แƒฅแƒ›แƒœแƒ แƒ›แƒกแƒแƒคแƒšแƒ˜แƒแƒจแƒ˜ แƒงแƒ•แƒ”แƒšแƒแƒ–แƒ” แƒ“แƒแƒชแƒฃแƒšแƒ˜ แƒแƒ•แƒขแƒแƒ›แƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒ˜. แƒžแƒ แƒแƒ”แƒฅแƒขแƒ˜ 10 แƒฌแƒ”แƒšแƒ˜ แƒ’แƒแƒ’แƒ แƒซแƒ”แƒšแƒ“แƒ. แƒกแƒแƒ‘แƒแƒšแƒแƒ แƒฏแƒแƒ›แƒจแƒ˜, แƒ›แƒแƒก แƒ›แƒแƒ แƒ—แƒแƒšแƒ˜แƒ แƒ“แƒแƒกแƒแƒฎแƒฃแƒšแƒ˜ แƒ›แƒ˜แƒ–แƒแƒœแƒ˜ แƒ‘แƒแƒšแƒแƒ›แƒ“แƒ” แƒ•แƒ”แƒ  แƒ’แƒแƒ›แƒแƒฃแƒ•แƒ˜แƒ“แƒ แƒ›แƒแƒ’แƒ แƒแƒ› แƒ›แƒ˜แƒกแƒ›แƒ แƒฅแƒ›แƒœแƒ˜แƒšแƒ”แƒ‘แƒแƒ› แƒ›แƒกแƒแƒคแƒšแƒแƒจแƒ˜ แƒงแƒ•แƒ”แƒšแƒแƒ–แƒ” แƒฃแƒชแƒœแƒแƒฃแƒ แƒ˜ แƒแƒ•แƒขแƒแƒ›แƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒ˜แƒก แƒขแƒ˜แƒขแƒฃแƒšแƒ˜ แƒ›แƒแƒ˜แƒœแƒช แƒ“แƒแƒ˜แƒ›แƒกแƒแƒฎแƒฃแƒ แƒ. แƒ แƒ”แƒแƒšแƒฃแƒ แƒแƒ“, แƒ˜แƒ’แƒ˜ แƒ”แƒ แƒ—-แƒ”แƒ แƒ—แƒ˜ แƒžแƒ˜แƒ แƒ•แƒ”แƒšแƒ˜ แƒแƒ•แƒขแƒแƒ›แƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒ˜แƒ 1957 แƒฌแƒšแƒ˜แƒก Aurora-แƒกแƒ—แƒแƒœ แƒ”แƒ แƒ—แƒแƒ“ แƒ แƒแƒ›แƒ”แƒšแƒ˜แƒช แƒ”แƒฅแƒกแƒžแƒ”แƒ แƒ˜แƒ›แƒ”แƒœแƒขแƒแƒšแƒฃแƒ  แƒฃแƒกแƒแƒคแƒ แƒ—แƒฎแƒ แƒแƒ•แƒขแƒแƒ›แƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒแƒ“ แƒจแƒ”แƒ˜แƒฅแƒ›แƒœแƒ.

  • แƒกแƒแƒแƒ•แƒขแƒแƒ›แƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒ แƒจแƒ˜แƒ’แƒแƒฌแƒ•แƒ˜แƒก แƒซแƒ แƒแƒ•แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜

    แƒกแƒแƒแƒ•แƒขแƒแƒ›แƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒšแƒ แƒขแƒ แƒแƒœแƒกแƒžแƒแƒ แƒขแƒจแƒ˜ แƒ“แƒฆแƒ”แƒ˜แƒกแƒ—แƒ•แƒ˜แƒก แƒ’แƒแƒ›แƒแƒงแƒ”แƒœแƒ”แƒ‘แƒฃแƒšแƒ˜แƒ แƒœแƒแƒ•แƒ—แƒแƒ‘แƒฃแƒ แƒ˜ แƒฌแƒแƒ แƒ›แƒแƒจแƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒก แƒ—แƒฎแƒ”แƒ•แƒแƒ“ แƒกแƒแƒฌแƒ•แƒแƒ•แƒ–แƒ” (แƒแƒœ แƒแƒ˜แƒ แƒแƒ“ แƒกแƒแƒฌแƒ•แƒแƒ•แƒ–แƒ”) แƒ›แƒแƒ›แƒฃแƒจแƒแƒ•แƒ” แƒจแƒ˜แƒ’แƒแƒฌแƒ•แƒ˜แƒก แƒซแƒ แƒแƒ•แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ˜. แƒแƒฆแƒœแƒ˜แƒจแƒœแƒฃแƒšแƒ˜ แƒ”แƒœแƒ”แƒ แƒ’แƒ”แƒขแƒ˜แƒ™แƒฃแƒšแƒ˜ แƒ“แƒแƒœแƒแƒ“แƒ’แƒแƒ แƒ˜แƒก แƒ“แƒแƒœแƒ˜แƒจแƒœแƒฃแƒšแƒ”แƒ‘แƒแƒ แƒœแƒแƒ•แƒ—แƒแƒ‘แƒฃแƒ แƒ˜ แƒฌแƒแƒ แƒ›แƒแƒจแƒแƒ‘แƒ˜แƒก แƒกแƒแƒฌแƒ•แƒแƒ•แƒ˜แƒก แƒฌแƒ•แƒ˜แƒก แƒจแƒ”แƒ“แƒ”แƒ’แƒแƒ“ แƒ›แƒ˜แƒฆแƒ”แƒ‘แƒฃแƒšแƒ˜ แƒฅแƒ˜แƒ›แƒ˜แƒฃแƒ แƒ˜ แƒ”แƒœแƒ”แƒ แƒ’แƒ˜แƒ แƒ’แƒแƒ แƒ“แƒแƒฅแƒ›แƒœแƒแƒก แƒ›แƒ”แƒฅแƒแƒœแƒ˜แƒ™แƒฃแƒ  แƒ”แƒœแƒ”แƒ แƒ’แƒ˜แƒแƒ“.

  • แƒ แƒ แƒแƒ แƒ˜แƒก Top fuel แƒ“แƒ แƒ แƒ˜แƒ— แƒ’แƒแƒœแƒกแƒฎแƒ•แƒแƒ•แƒ“แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ แƒ‘แƒ”แƒœแƒ–แƒ˜แƒœแƒ˜แƒกแƒแƒ’แƒแƒœ

    แƒ—แƒฃแƒ™แƒ˜ แƒ’แƒœแƒ”แƒ‘แƒแƒ•แƒ— แƒจแƒ”แƒฅแƒ›แƒœแƒแƒ— แƒ›แƒแƒฆแƒแƒšแƒ˜ แƒกแƒ˜แƒซแƒšแƒ˜แƒ”แƒ แƒ˜แƒก แƒ›แƒฅแƒแƒœแƒ” 4 แƒขแƒแƒฅแƒขแƒ˜แƒแƒœแƒ˜ (Stroke) แƒซแƒ แƒแƒ•แƒ, แƒแƒ แƒกแƒ”แƒ‘แƒแƒ‘แƒก แƒ แƒแƒ›แƒแƒ“แƒ”แƒœแƒ˜แƒ›แƒ” แƒ›แƒ”แƒ—แƒแƒ“แƒ˜ แƒ›แƒ˜แƒก แƒ›แƒ˜แƒกแƒแƒฆแƒฌแƒ”แƒ•แƒแƒ“. แƒžแƒ˜แƒ แƒ•แƒ”แƒšแƒ˜: แƒ’แƒแƒ•แƒ–แƒแƒ แƒ“แƒแƒ— แƒขแƒแƒฅแƒขแƒ˜. แƒ›แƒ”แƒแƒ แƒ”: แƒ“แƒแƒ•แƒแƒงแƒ”แƒœแƒแƒ— แƒขแƒฃแƒ แƒ‘แƒ˜แƒœแƒ/แƒกแƒฃแƒžแƒ”แƒ แƒฉแƒแƒ แƒฏแƒ”แƒ แƒ˜. แƒ›แƒ”แƒกแƒแƒ›แƒ” แƒ“แƒ แƒ‘แƒแƒšแƒ: แƒจแƒ”แƒ•แƒชแƒ•แƒแƒšแƒแƒ— แƒ‘แƒ”แƒœแƒ–แƒ˜แƒœแƒ˜ แƒกแƒฎแƒ•แƒ แƒฃแƒคแƒ แƒ แƒ”แƒœแƒ”แƒ แƒ’แƒ”แƒขแƒ˜แƒ™แƒฃแƒšแƒ˜ แƒกแƒแƒฌแƒ•แƒแƒ•แƒ˜แƒ—. แƒฎแƒแƒšแƒ แƒ แƒแƒช แƒจแƒ”แƒ”แƒฎแƒ”แƒ‘แƒ Top fuel แƒ“แƒ แƒแƒ’แƒกแƒขแƒ”แƒ แƒ”แƒ‘แƒก, แƒกแƒแƒ›แƒ˜แƒ•แƒ”แƒก แƒ”แƒ แƒ—แƒ˜แƒแƒœแƒแƒ“ แƒแƒ™แƒ”แƒ—แƒ”แƒ‘แƒ”แƒœ.

Followers

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Why You Still Shouldn't Panic About Car Hacking

Security researchers have figured out how to wirelessly hack into a car and take over its controls from anywhere in the world. But you're probably still safe.



This week, Wired published a fantastic and unsettling report on the current state of automotive hacking. Senior Writer Andy Greenberg ​put himself at the mercy of two digital security researchers as they wirelessly took over control of the Jeep Cherokee he was driving, messing with the car's climate control, stereo, windshield wipers, and eventually stalling the engine. Greenberg was left helpless, coasting nearly to a stop in the right lane of a busy highway as traffic scrambled to avoid him. 

The Wired report is the most credible evidence yet that our increasingly tech-laden vehicles are ripe for hacking, with scanty security measures and an astounding lack of automaker foresight providing avenues for hackers to gain control of a car's functions from anywhere in the world. Whereas previous car hacking stories contained some pretty big caveats—like the fact that evildoers would need todisassemble a car's dashboard and physically plug in a laptop to take over the vehicle's controls—the Jeep that Greenberg was driving was unmodified from how it left the factory. And the researchers who took over its controls were 10 miles away.


That, frankly, is terrifying. Greenberg's article in Wired is nuanced and even-handed, and he carefully and purposefully avoids fearful exaggeration, but the evidence he so thoroughly presents is deeply troubling. It set off a frenzy in the automotive press, and rightly so.
But you probably don't need to panic. And here's why.

The Methodology Is Sound

Greenberg's terrifying hacker roller coaster ride was carried out by Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek, a duo that's been doggedly poking at holes in modern cars' computer systems for years. Miller and Valasek are the team behind most of the "car hacking" news stories of the past few years. In 2013, they took Greenberg (then writing for Forbes) for a thrill ride in a Toyota Prius and a Ford Escape, both wired with laptops in the back seat to take over the driver's controls. Last year, Miller, a security researcher at Twitter, and Valasek, a director at digital security firm IOActive, published a white paper naming what they thought were the most hackable new cars on the U.S. market. Not surprisingly, their number-one hackable car, the 2014 Jeep Cherokee, is the car of choice in this experiment. 
Miller and Valasek's latest and most frightening exploit is completely wireless. Thanks to a vulnerability in Fiat Chrysler's Uconnect dashboard infotainment system, which offers in-car WiFi through Sprint's cellular network, a smartphone connected to Miller's laptop lets him look around the cellular network for Uconnect-equipped vehicles. Using software he and Valasek designed, Miller can see a vulnerable car's vehicle identification number, make, model, and IP address, along with its GPS location, in real-time. Once they've found a target vehicle, Miller and Valasek can worm their way into the entertainment system's firmware, implanting malicious code they designed that can transmit commands to any system connected to the car's network of computers—including the devices that control the car's steering, brakes, and engine and transmission.
Miller and Valasek say that Uconnect systems installed from late 2013 through early 2015 are vulnerable, and while they've only tried their remote-takeover techniques on their own Jeep Cherokee, they estimate that nearly 500,000 vehicles carry the compromised system. FCA issued a statement in response detailing which models of Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep and Ram vehicles are affected. 
But while the Wired video that goes alongside Greenberg's Wired piece makes the hacking process look astoundingly simple—just two dudes on a couch, tapping away at their laptops, wreaking havoc on a Jeep on a highway 10 miles away—it was a long and arduous road that led up to that scene. And that's good news for drivers of potentially-vulnerable Uconnect-equipped vehicles. 

The Good Guys

Miller and Valasek's methodology is a marathon, not a sprint. After first finding the one small vulnerability point that allows them to tap into a Uconnect-equipped car's electronics, it took the duo months of arduous coding to develop the code that lets them rewrite the firmware and take over the car's driving controls. And every step of the way, Miller and Valasek have gone about this the ethical way.
The slightly unsettling aspect of all this is that Miller and Valasek plan to publish their findings online, in conjunction with a talk they're giving at the Black Hat digital security conference next month. In fact, that's the best tool to protect us from the dystopian horror of a future of hackable cars. 
Greenberg points out that Miller and Valasek have been sharing their findings with Chrysler for nearly nine months, allowing the automaker to devise a software update that closes the loophole that allowed the hackers entry in the first place. FCA notified affected owners on July 16th, though they did not acknowledge the hacking duo that discovered it. You can see FCA's list of affected vehicles, and download the patch to update your Uconnect-equipped car, right here. By the time the digital security community learns the details of Miller and Valasek's exploit, the fix to prevent it will be widely available, thanks to the hackers' cooperation with FCA.
Secondly, the car-hacking duo is only revealing a small portion of their findings. They won't publish the code that gives them  access to the car's engine and braking controls; neither will they identify the (now-patched) vulnerability that let them in. 
In other words, armed with Miller and Valasek's published findings, a malicious hacker would still need to figure out how to hack into a Uconnect-equipped vehicle, and reverse-engineer the code that allows control of the vehicle, two tasks that took months for these expert-level security hackers. Additionally, Miller and Valasek's method requires them to know the IP address of the car they're trying to hack; as Jason Torchinsky at Jalopnik points out, that drops the likelihood of a hacker targeting one specific vehicle down to near-zero. 
Why publish anything, though? Greenberg explains
The two researchers say that even if their code makes it easier for malicious hackers to attack unpatched Jeeps, the release is nonetheless warranted because it allows their work to be proven through peer review. It also sends a message: Automakers need to be held accountable for their vehicles' digital security. "If consumers don't realize this is an issue, they should, and they should start complaining to carmakers," Miller says. "This might be the kind of software bug most likely to kill someone."​

​Help Is On the Way

Simply by virtue of making their findings public, Miller and Valasek helped kick off a fix that will eliminate the vulnerability that made their hack possible. FCA says it has rectified the loophole that allowed the hack in its 2015 models, and released a software update to close the vulnerability in 2013 and 2014 vehicles. When Miller and Valasek publish and discuss their findings at Black Hat, they'll be giving out an incomplete recipe that hinges on a software flaw that has since been patched. And the work of hackers like Miller, Valasek, and others is finally bringing the right kind of attention to the subject: On the same day that Greenberg published his Wired article, Senators Ed Markey and Richard Blumenthal introduced new legislation creating the first-ever automotive cybersecurity standards, which would require greater security measures to prevent malicious code from jumping from infotainment systems to vehicle controls, and establish real-time monitoring to "immediately detect, report, and stop" hacking attempts. 
And as more and more cars get the capability to receive over-the-air software updates, manufacturers will be able to more quickly and efficiently patch vulnerabilities like the one that let Miller and Valasek hack into their Cherokee. That day is coming—Ford and Tesla already have systems capable of automatic over-the-air software updates, and more will soon follow.
So, should you be scared? That's up to you. Is there a hacker out there who knows your Chrysler vehicle's IP address, possesses masters-level computing skills, and has months to devote to reverse-engineering a way to take over your car? If you're not some kind of international spy, the answer is probably "no." 
                                                                     Source: Road and Track